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Comment
What's So Special About Multinational
Enterprises?: A Comment on Avi-Yonah
MERRITT B. Fox*

Reuven Avi-Yonah's provocative article published in the
preceding issue of this Journal, National Regulation and
Multinational Enterprises,1 establishes a comprehensive framework
for determining which governmental institutions should regulate
behavior occurring within multinational enterprises ("MNEs"). Using
this framework, Avi-Yonah divvies out regulatory responsibility
between host and home countries with respect to several kinds of
INE behavior. He also concludes that there are areas where national
regulation does not work, leaving MNEs subject to too little law. He
proposes correcting this deficiency through creation of a world
investment organization ("WIO").
MNEs have clearly grown to play a huge role in the world
economy. 2 In my view, however, this development does not
necessarily require the large legal reconceptualization that Avi-Yonah
proposes. Nor, at this point at least, does it call for the creation of a
WIO. This having been said, Avi-Yonah's article deserves credit for
shining a spotlight on a number of regulatory issues relating to INE
behavior and doing so in a fresh way that provokes needed new
attention.
My analysis of the legal challenges posed by the growth of
MNEs is based on an examination of a number of the examples used
by Avi-Yonah to illustrate the working of his framework: piercing the
corporate veil for mass torts (as in the Bhopal toxic chemical release),
* Michael E. Patterson Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, B.A. 1968, J.D.
1976, Ph.D. (Economics) 1980, Yale University.
1. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of MultinationalEnterprises:An Essay
on Comity, Extraterritoriality,and Harmonization,42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 5 (2003).

2. Professor Avi-Yonah sets out an impressive set of statistics confirming the large
importance of MNEs in the world economy. Id. at 6-7.
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bribery, bankruptcy, child labor and antitrust. My approach focuses
on the ways in which MNEs are special. To what extent do particular
forms of behavior occurring within MNEs raise regulatory problems
similar to problems raised by the same behavior occurring within
other institutional arrangements, and to what extent does it raise
problems that are different? Failure to ask these questions risks
having the mere fact that a behavior occurs within an MNE obscure
the most fundamental features of the question of who should decide
whether and how to regulate the behavior.
Only where the
involvement of an MNE raises special problems is the application of
MNE law even potentially justified.
Part I is devoted to an examination of Avi-Yonah's Bhopal,
bribery, bankruptcy, child labor and antitrust examples. It will
employ the assumption that the governments of the countries involved
act to maximize the welfare of their citizens when regulating purely
domestic versions of the same behaviors. Part II briefly considers
whether the rise in MNEs particularly undermines this assumption
and how my conclusions might change if it were abandoned.
I.

WHAT AvI-YONAH'S EXAMPLES HAVE TO TEACH

A.

PreliminaryObservations

1.

The Primacy of the Location of a Behavior and of its Effects
Over the Institution Exhibiting the Behavior

Where a behavior is conducted and where its effects are felt,
not the nature of the institution engaging in it, should be the initial
focus of inquiry. If a behavior occurs in Country X that has negative
effects somewhere, X will want to consider regulating it. If some of
the persons negatively affected reside in Country Y, Y will want to
consider regulating it as well. For each country, an important factor
in its decision concerning whether or not to regulate the behavior is
the impact of such regulation on the other country. Each of these
propositions is equally valid whether the behavior occurs within an
MNE or not.
International law's limitations on a country's jurisdiction to
prescribe represents an already well-developed jurisprudence relating
to these matters. This jurisprudence reflects the underlying values at
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stake in deciding who should regulate a behavior that affects multiple
states. Sections 402 and 403 of the ALI Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law3 represent an authoritative statement of the general
U.S. view of the international law of jurisdiction to prescribe. These
sections, while not usually providing definitive answers, create a
useful framework for analyzing the five examples from Avi-Yonah's
article. Section 402 sets out the kinds of conduct that give a state
prima facie jurisdiction to prescribe. These include conduct occurring
within the state and conduct occurring outside the state, the effects of
which are felt within the state. Section 403 prohibits a state from
exercising this prima facie jurisdiction to prescribe where such
exercise is unreasonable or where it is reasonable but another state
has a conflicting prescription and the other state's interest in
exercising jurisdiction to prescribe is clearly greater. The analysis
needed to determine whether prima facie jurisdiction exists under
section 402 is generally straightforward. The inquiry concerning
whether either of the section 403 prohibitions applies requires a more
nuanced analysis including inquiry into such considerations as the
statutory purposes of the regulations involved, private expectations,
the policies and interests of each country's government, and the
intensity with which these policies and interests are pursued. An
economic analysis of the incidence of the behavior's ultimate effects
often significantly advances this inquiry.
2.

The Most Obvious Difference MNE Involvement Makes

Where X is a host country to an MNE subsidiary whose parent
is headquartered in home country Y, the mere fact that the behavior
occurs within an MNE does not usually change in any apparent way
the merits of each country's substantive claims to regulate the
behavior. The most obvious way that a behavior occurring within an
NINE differs from one occurring in some other institutional context is
pragmatic: enforcement is easier. Assume that the MNE undertakes
an act within the territory of host country X. Y has a regulation
prohibiting this kind of behavior that purports to apply
extraterritorially to reach this act. Y, because of its jurisdiction over
the MNE, will find it more convenient to enforce its regulation than if
3.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402-

03 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
4.

See HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 847-48 (4th ed.

1994); Merritt B. Fox, The PoliticalEconomy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a
Globalizing Marketfor Securities, 97 MICH. L. REv. 696, 722-30 (1998).
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some other kind of institution were the entity undertaking the act
within X's territory. Similarly, when the MNE undertakes an act
within the territory of Y and X has a regulation prohibiting this kind
of behavior that purports to apply extraterritorially to reach this act,
X, because of the presence of substantial assets of the INE within its
jurisdiction, will find it more convenient to enforce its regulation than
if some other kind of institution were acting within Y's territory.
Thus in each case, the involvement of an MNE, by enhancing the
ability of a state effectively to enforce its regulation of extraterritorial
acts, may sharpen the conflict between the regulating state and the
state in which the regulated behavior occurs.
3.

Welfare Maximization Assumption

As is conventional in studying the regulation of behavior with
potential cross-border effects, this part will assume that, as a
reasonable first approximation of reality, the governments of the
countries involved act in their countries' own best interests when
regulating purely domestic versions of the same behaviors. This, for
example, is a fundamental assumption behind the governmentalinterest method for identifying "true conflicts" of law.5 More
generally, it is the assumption that appears most consistent with any
welfare maximization-based normative justification for state
sovereignty's special place in international law. The assumption will
be relaxed in Part II.
B.

The Examples

1.

Bhopal and Veil Piercing for Mass Torts

The Bhopal incident involved a toxic chemical release by the
Indian subsidiary of the U.S. headquartered Union Carbide
Corporation ("Union Carbide"), which resulted in the deaths of over
two thousand persons and the injury of 200,000 more.6 The Indian
government sought recovery in tort on behalf of the victims in the
Indian courts. The damage from the toxic release substantially
5.

See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1

(1963); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1990).
6. Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at 13.
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exceeded the value of the assets of the Indian subsidiary. Substantive
liability on the part of the subsidiary was clearly governed by the laws
of India, where the spill occurred. What made this a transnational
case was India's attempt to gain jurisdiction over Union Carbide. In
doing so, India was seeking to apply its veil piercing rule to get at the
assets of a parent company that, in this case, was located outside
India.
A careful economic analysis suggests that India is the best
judge of what veil piercing rule should apply with regard to torts
committed in India by subsidiary corporations organized under its
laws. This conclusion holds regardless of whether the parent is Indian
or foreign. From an ex ante efficiency point of view, the decision
concerning whether or not to pierce the veil under any given set of
circumstances involves a trade-off. On the one hand, allowing veil
piercing makes persons who can control the acts of a subsidiary feel
the consequences of their decisions more fully and hence enhances
the deterrence function of tort liability. An expectation that the veil
will be pierced eliminates the externalization of risk that otherwise
results from limited liability.7 It thus discourages inefficiently risky
behavior that can have negative effects on persons residing in India.
On the other hand, piercing the veil denies limited liability to an
operation that is part of a larger organization but is operated through a
subsidiary. Denying the operation limited liability puts it at a
disadvantage relative to a stand-alone operation competing in the
same line of business. The expectation that the veil will be pierced in
this situation discourages the larger organization from establishing
such an operation in the first place even where the inclusion of such
operations within a larger firm is the most efficient way of conducting
business.8
India gains when it chooses a veil piercing rule that properly
balances this trade-off between deterring inefficiently risky behavior
and encouraging efficient organizational form. To see why, start with
the observation that there are many corporations looking for positive
net present value ("NPV") investment opportunities around the
world.9 Finding such opportunities in a given country requires skill
and effort on the part of the corporations looking for them. Each
7. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited ShareholderLiabilityfor
CorporateTorts, 100 YALE L. J. 1879 (1991).
8. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTuRE OF
CORPORATE LAW 57 (1991).
9. The concept of a positive net present value investment opportunity and the value
creation that results from corporations searching for such opportunities is further discussed in
Part I.B.2, infra.
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corporation must decide how much to invest in developing this skill
and how much effort to deploy looking for positive net present value
projects in a given country. A corporation searching for such a
project knows that its determination of the present value of a potential
project will need to take account of the regulations of the country
where the opportunity is located, including the country's veil piercing
rules. Like a tax, these regulations affect the project's rate of return
that the corporation can expect. The more that Indian regulations
reduce the expected returns from the projects, the less corporations
will search in India for positive NPV projects. Less searching means
fewer such opportunities will be found, which means India is not able
in essence to sell as many such opportunities. India will therefore
experience the gain from whatever positive things are accomplished
by the regulations and suffer the loss from fewer opportunities being
found and the resulting reduced investment.
In this instance, the gain from a rule permitting piercing the
veil under any given set of circumstances is improved deterrence. The
loss is the reduction in the number of projects that receive investment
because firms that may be particularly suited to searching for and
implementing such projects-the large firm with multiple activitieswill find it less profitable to do so. India thus gets the benefit from a
rule that comes as close as possible to allowing veil piercing under all
the circumstances where the gain exceeds the loss and prohibiting it
under all the circumstances where the gain is less than the loss. This
is so whether the parent company is a foreign MNE or an Indian
entity.
The foregoing analysis suggests that India's attempt to pierce
the veil and hold Union Carbide responsible for the tort liabilities of
its Indian subsidiary is within India's jurisdiction to prescribe under
international law, at least assuming the basis of its claim is a rule of
law that is consistently applied to Indian as well as foreign parent
corporations. The fact that the parent is American rather than Indian
simply creates a problem of enforcement. In the Bhopal case,
however, India was assisted in solving this enforcement problem by
the decision of a U.S. court hearing a class action suit against Union
Carbide under U.S. law for the same damages. The U.S. Court
conditioned its forum non conveniens dismissal of the U.S. suit on
Union Carbide's acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Indian courts for
the parallel Indian action.
The approach here is somewhat different than that of AviYonah's article. His article suggests normatively that in toxic tort
cases, the law should not as a general matter require an enterprise
approach (i.e. require veil piercing) and that the matter should be
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resolved on a case-by-case basis through a comity analysis."' This
response suggests that where a host country has a consistently applied
veil piercing rule, the host country is not prohibited under
international law from applying it to MNE parent corporations.
Global welfare will be maximized if MNE home countries assist in
the enforcement of such a rule, as in fact happened in the Bhopal
case. 12
2.

Bribery

Bribery of government officials, whether undertaken by a
purely domestic company or by the subsidiary of a foreign one, would
at first glance appear to be only a matter of concern for the country
whose officials are being bribed. Bribes, where common, become an

alternative form of compensation for public officials and may result in
a different pattern of official decisions than would be the case if no
bribery occurred. The issue for the country whose officials are being

bribed is whether these effects are considered undesirable.
Widespread bribery in a country may indicate that the country does
not consider these effects undesirable,

3

a view consistent with the

11. Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at 15.
12. Avi-Yonah states "The Bhopal case would thus represent an exception, in which the
extraordinary nature of the case caused the U.S. court to approve of a remedy that effectively
implemented an enterprise approach (host country extraterritoriality)." Id. It is not clear that
the feature that makes the Bhopal case exceptional-the horrifying aggregate amount of
damage-adds to the case for veil piercing. Every tort victim is an individual who suffers
whether others suffer simultaneously or not. The goal of the tort system is to compensate for
this suffering, and to deter the risky behavior that caused it. In accordance with these goals,
each victim of the tort of a subsidiary who suffers death or serious injury that would be left
uncompensated absent veil piercing would appear to have an equally good claim against the
parent regardless of the aggregate amount of damage caused by the tortfeasor. Indeed, the
Bhopal case, if anything, has features that would make it a particularly weak case for veil
piercing. As noted by Avi-Yonah, as a result of "performance requirements" imposed by the
Indian government to encourage technology transfers to India, "no Americans were
employed at the plant and none had visited it for a year prior to the accident." Id. at 14. This
suggests that Indian law promoted a rather dilute kind of control by Union Carbide over its
Indian subsidiary. When control is dilute, the expectation by a parent company that the veil
will be pierced will not be as effective in preventing the subsidiary from undertaking overly
risky activities. This weakens the case for veil piercing since the cost-discouraging
efficient organizational form-is the same, but the prospect of benefit-improved
deterrence-is diminished.
13. The prevalent attitude among developed countries appears to be that widespread
bribery is contrary to the best interests of the countries in which it is found. Some
commentators have suggested that this attitude represents a kind of cultural imperialism. See
GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 129
(1982); Steven R. Salbu, TransnationalBribery. The Big Questions, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 435 (2001).
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operating assumption of this Part that a country's government acts in
the country's own best interests. Alternatively, as will be discussed
briefly in Part II, widespread bribery may indicate that the country is
displaying a deep-seated political failure.
With bribery, there is something about the presence of an
MNE that makes the problem unique.
The matter is made
transnational by the very fact that the company paying the bribe is a
subsidiary of an MINE rather than a domestic company. The MNE's
home country may feel it has a stake in limiting bribe paying behavior
occurring in the host country and may seek to regulate the behavior
through its jurisdiction over the parent company. A prominent
example of such regulation is the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. 4
A bribe paying MNIE's home country may be concerned about
such host country bribery for two reasons. One relates to foreign
policy. When an MNE subsidiary pays a bribe to an official of a host
country and the bribe becomes known, the host country population
may resent the home country simply for its association with the
MNE." For example, revelations of payments by the U.S. defense
contractor Lockheed in the 1970s to high officials in countries such as
Japan and the Netherlands toppled governments and caused
significant embarrassment for the United States. 6
The second reason a home country may be concerned with
bribes paid by its MNEs to host country officials relates to the home
country's economic self interest. These bribes are an extra cost of
business being paid by the MINEs that could be eliminated if all firms
competing for the investment opportunity involved were disabled
from paying it. Firms seeking new investment opportunities in a host
country are searching for projects with positive NPVs, i.e. projects
with a higher return to them than the risk adjusted market cost of
capital. As discussed in more detail below, the difference between
the "global" rate of the return on the project (the return if the investor
had unfettered access to invest in the opportunity) and the market cost
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1-2 (2001).
15. There appears to be an inconsistency between the presence of such resentment and
the proposition that widespread bribery in a country indicates that its effects are not
considered undesirable. This may well be so, but the matter is not clear-cut. Within any
given culture, the moral ambiguities surrounding bribery and the relationship between
professed public sentiment and interest-based action are highly complex.
16. See SAIKO SAIBANSHO & JIMU SOKYOKU, SERIES OF PROMINENT JUDGMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT UPON QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY: JUDGMENT UPON THE CASE OF THE
SO-CALLED MARUBENI ROUTE IN THE LOCKHEED CASE 28 (1997); Larry Martz, et. Al., The $7
Million Man in Tokyo, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 1976.
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of capital are rents that are the joint product of, on the one hand, the
skill and effort of the firms that find these opportunities and, on the
other, the unique qualities of the opportunity to be found. When a
host country official conditions access to such opportunities on the
payment of a bribe, she is extracting a portion of this rent for herself.
Legislation prohibiting MNEs from paying bribes abroad combats this
extraction, potentially leaving more rents for the MNEs."7
To the extent that there is competition among MNEs to find
and seize these investment opportunities, all of the MNEs must be
disabled from paying bribes for this reduction in rent extraction to
occur. The fact that MNEs come from a number of different home
countries means that multinational legislation is needed, which
of Foreign
explains the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery
18
Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
A home country regulation prohibiting its MNEs from paying
bribes to host country officials is within its jurisdiction to prescribe.
Applying the Restatement's jurisdiction to prescribe framework to the
matter, the fact that the MNE is the home country's own national
gives the home country prima facie jurisdiction. 9 The fact that the
prohibited act is bribery means that the host country, by definition,
does not have a conflicting prescription that could defeat this prima
facie jurisdiction. Nor, as shown just below, could prima facie
jurisdiction be defeated by the argument that it is unreasonable for the
home country to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe based on either of
the two reasons discussed above.
The first reason is the concern about the foreign policy impact
17. This story is told in terms of two alternatives. One alternative is that an MNE's
access to a country's investment opportunities is restricted by the condition that it must pay a
bribe before it can invest. The second alternative is that, with bribes eliminated, the MNE
has unfettered access to these opportunities. Between these two alternatives, an MNE home
country government would clearly prefer the second because its MNEs could capture all, not
just a portion, of the difference between the global return on the project and the market return
on capital. But there is a third alternative. Access could be conditioned upon payment of
some kind of concession fee to the host country government or to private property owners
within the country. If the choice were seen as one between the first alternative and the third,
an MNE home country government might be fairly indifferent in terms of the home country's
economic interests. The difference between the first and third alternatives would be more a
question of distribution of wealth within the host country. The reality is that a reduction in
bribes, the first alternative, would probably result in an increase in each of the other two
alternatives. Some of the reduction in bribes would go to increased rents to the MNEs for
their entrepreneurial activities, and some to increased concession fees and payments to
private property holders.
18. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec.
18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998).
19. See supra notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text.
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of it becoming known that one of the home country's nationals has
paid a bribe to a foreign official. This seems near the core of why the
nationality of a regulated party gives rise to prima facie jurisdiction in
the first place: the reasonable interest of a state that its nationals,
wherever located, not do things harmful to their own country.2"
The second reason, improving the home country MNEs'
returns by eliminating the need to pay bribes, requires a bit more
analysis. The economic magnet that drives all new real investment is
the difference between the expected return on the investment and the
market cost of capital. Where the expected return exceeds the market
cost of capital, the investment opportunity has a positive NPV.
Consider an MNE contemplating an investment opportunity involving
building a project that will operate in a host country. Oversimplifying slightly, if there were no bribes, concession fees (whether
labeled as such or in the form of taxes with similar effect) or real
property related costs, the net present value of the project would be
the amount by which the project's lifetime net operating revenues
(roughly, the difference between gross revenues and the cost of
operating inputs such as labor and supplies) exceeds the cost of
implementing the real investment (the capital facility necessary for
the project to operate), each discounted to present value at the market
cost of capital (the expected return on market traded investments such
as the shares of public companies which have comparable risk). We
might refer to this as the project's "global net present value." The
NPV of the opportunity to the MNE will be smaller than its global net
present value if bribes, concession fees or real property costs must be
paid.
The existence of an opportunity with a positive global net
present value is the joint product of two necessary factors. One factor
is the uniqueness of the investment opportunities available in the host
country. The other is the special ability of investing firms, such as the
MNE contemplating the project, to find these opportunities. Each of
these factors is necessary and so the opportunity's positive global net
present value represents a kind of rent resulting from the joint product
of the two.
Countries often impose regulations intended to influence the
division of these rents between persons in the host country who
control access to the opportunities and those, perhaps coming from
abroad, with special skills in finding and exploiting the opportunity.
Examples of host country regulations with this aim include rules
20. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 402(2) (recognizing nationality as one nbasis for
the jurisdiction to prescribe).
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defining domestic property rights and the division thereof between
private and public persons, rules restricting foreign ownership, rules
allowing private persons controlling access to these opportunities to
coordinate their activities, and rules imposing concession fees and
other taxes related to the seizing of these opportunities. An example
of MNE home country regulation with the aim of influencing the
division of rents is a rule seeking to limit cartels abroad. A home
country regulation prohibiting its MNEs from paying bribes to host
country officials, if done at least in part for economic reasons, would
be another effort at improving the home country's share of these
rents.
Regulations seeking to influence the division of rents in this
way are widespread and generally accepted. This strongly suggests
that such rules do not constitute an unreasonable exercise of
jurisdiction to prescribe. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that
in the typical case, it would be hard to argue that such a regulation
clearly decreases global economic welfare. The welfare implications
of any alteration in the division of rents are complex even as a
theoretical matter. Moreover, whether the effect increases or
decreases welfare depends on facts that are unlikely to be known with
any certainty by even the most astute and objective observers.
I would agree with Avi-Yonah that in the case of bribes, the
presence of an INE gives the problem of legal regulation distinctive
features. He and I deal with these features in quite a different way,
however. Avi-Yonah finds that both the home country and host
country agree that bribery of host country officials is undesirable.21
Based on this finding, he uses his new comprehensive framework to
suggest that this behavior is an appropriate target of extraterritorially
applied MNE home country regulation.2 Given how widespread such
bribery is in many host countries, I am not confident that these
countries appropriately can be described as disapproving of such
behavior. As a consequence, justification of home country
extraterritorial regulation would be more convincing if it did not rely
on the assumption of host country disapproval of the activity being
regulated. As we have seen just above, economic analysis combined
with the traditional jurisdiction to prescribe framework can provide
such a justification.

21.

Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at 17-19.

22.

Id. at 20.
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Bankruptcy

Avi-Yonah also uses his comprehensive new framework to
address the issue of whose law should apply in the case of an MNE
bankruptcy. He suggests that economic analysis shows that, ex ante,
it is in the interests of both home and host countries that home
country law be the one to determine the division of the MNE's assets,
wherever those assets might be located. He uses this ex ante interest
analysis to find that home and host nations "agree" on this result.
Based on this finding, his comprehensive framework again leads to
the conclusion that home country law should be applied
extraterritorially and reach the MNE's assets abroad.2 3 This seems
like the right conclusion, but it is not the involvement of an MNE that
raises special regulatory problems in need of resolution. Moreover,
the notion that the countries in fact agree seems an exaggeration.
The starting point in the analysis is to note that we are not
dealing here with the bankruptcy of an MNE's host country
subsidiary. If a subsidiary with assets exclusively in the host country
cannot pay its debts, the matter should clearly be handled by host
country law. Any other treatment would violate the basic principle
that subsidiary creditors get first claim on subsidiary assets, and are
superior to the claims of parent company creditors who, relative to
subsidiary creditors, have the status of the subsidiary's equity holders.
Thus, the issue of whether home country rules should apply
extraterritorially applies only to MNE parent company bankruptcies,
and the parent company's assets abroad are equity, not real assets.
MNE parent companies, however, are a subset of all firms that raise
international bankruptcy issues. A bankrupt firm's assets abroad may
come in many other forms: bank accounts or accounts receivable
arising from trade, inventories of inputs or outputs, or passive
investments such as real estate. They all raise the same issues. The
tension, as Avi-Yonah correctly notes, is between the ex ante interests
of both countries that the bankrupt company's home country law
apply (the "universalist" approach recommended by most
commentators) and the ex post interest of the country where the assets
are located to allocate these assets to a favored set of creditors (the
"territorial" approach practiced by many countries). This tension
exists, however, whatever the nature of the bankrupt company's
assets abroad. In all these cases, absent the pre-existing agreement of
the country where the assets are located or a willingness to engage in
23. Avi-Yonah therefore adopts the "universalist" approach recommended by most
commentators, rather than the territorial approach adopted by many countries. Id. at 20-23.
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some kind of reciprocal self-restraint, the purported extraterritorial
application of the rules of the country of the bankrupt firm is not a
practical bar to the country abroad acting in its ex post best interests
and applying its own law.
4.

Child Labor

When a corporation employs children in a given country, the
direct effects of the practice are in the country where the employment
takes place. This is the country best positioned to determine the costs
and benefits of these direct effects and to regulate the behavior
accordingly. Nothing changes with regard to the interests of the
country where the employment takes place if the employer happens to
be the subsidiary of an MNE. Such an arrangement, however, does
result in another country having a possible interest in the behavior:
the MNE's home country. Specifically, the moral sensibilities of the
MNE home country's citizens may be offended by their country being
used as a staging ground for the promotion of a practice abroad that
can injure the health of children and limit or eliminate their ability to
obtain an education. 4 The home country is in a position to act on
these moral sensibilities if it is so inclined because of its jurisdiction
over the parent company, which in turn can control the subsidiary's
employment practices in the host country. If the home country does
act on these sensibilities, it effectively will be regulating behavior
extraterritorially in the host country even if as a formal matter the
regulation only goes to how the parent company exercises its control.
Such extraterritorial regulation is clearly within the home
country's jurisdiction to prescribe. The prima facie basis would be
the fact that the regulated party is a national of the home country.
The host country will not have a conflicting prescription requiring the
employment of child labor that could defeat this prima facie
jurisdiction. Nor could it be defeated by the argument that it is
unreasonable for the home country to regulate child labor in the host
country based on moral sensibilities.
The conclusion that it is not unreasonable for the home
24. As a result of competition from employers in the host country that enjoy the lower
costs permitted by their use of child labor, domestic manufacturing operations in the home
country may also be made less profitable, thereby reducing home country employment. This
effect, however, is independent of the question of whether the host country employer of child
labor is an MNE or not. Moreover, absent moral concerns, the home country loss in
profitability and jobs due to foreign competitors employing children is no different than
profit and job losses due to foreign competitors that enjoy lower costs arising from easier
access to resources, better technology or best business methods.
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country to regulate extraterritorially based on its sensibilities should
hold even if the absence of host country regulation effectively
prohibiting child labor is interpreted as representing an affirmative
policy in favor of encouraging the practice, which would mean that
there is a conflict between the interests of the home and host country.
To start, these moral sensibilities arise from broadly held international
concerns about the effects of child labor reflected in the resolutions of
international bodies.
Moreover, the home country pursues its
interest in the matter in the most accommodating way possible to host
country concerns. The regulation only applies to subsidiaries of its
MNEs. Accordingly, the home country regulation is at most only a
temporary impediment to fulfillment of the host country policy aims.
The home country restrictions on child labor put its MNE's
subsidiaries at a competitive disadvantage thereby creating profitable
opportunities for others not so restricted to expand.26
The difference between Avi-Yonah's approach and mine with
regard to child labor is very similar to the difference in approaches
with regard to bribery. Avi-Yonah finds that both the home country
and host country agree that child labor is undesirable 27 and, based on
his new comprehensive framework, suggests that this behavior
therefore is an appropriate target of extraterritorially applied MNE
home country regulation.28 While there is no doubt that most people
in both home and host countries would find child labor undesirable in
25. On November 20, 1989, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, available at www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/crc/
treaties/crc.htm. Specifically, Article 32 requires ratifying States to "recognize the right of
the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is
likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the
child's health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development." In this regard,
ratifying States must establish minimum age requirements, suitable working conditions
guidelines, and sanctions for violators of Article 32. In addition, on June 17, 1999, the
International Labor Organization, a U.N. specialized agency, passed the Worst Forms of
Child Labor Convention, available at http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/
appl/index.cfm. Specifically, this convention bans the use of children in slavery, in the sex
trade, in other illegal activities, and in activities that are likely to harm the child. See Michael
J. Dennis, CurrentDevelopment: The ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor,
93 AM. J. INT'L L. 943 (1999).
26. It is true that in many cases the unrestricted purely domestic host country
competitors may not have the advantage of the highly developed brand or technological
prowess of the restricted MNE. To the extent that this brand or prowess is necessary to
create the opportunity for child employment in the host country, however, this opportunity is
then the joint product of the brand or prowess and the labor conditions in the developing host
country. It does not seem unreasonable for the home country to condition use of a brand or
prowess developed by an MNE located within its territory on this advantage not being used
to promote child employment.
27. Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at 25.
28. Id. at 25-26.
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the abstract, the failure of many developing countries effectively to
end the practice may reflect their unwillingness to accept the resulting
reduced production, which is likely to aggravate poverty for at least a
number of years. Therefore, I am not confident that given the real
world constraints under which these countries operate, they can be
appropriately described as wanting to terminate the practice
immediately. As a consequence, justification of home country
extraterritorial regulation would be more convincing if it did not rely
on the assumption of host country disapproval of the activity being
regulated. Again, however, an alternative justification is available
based on the traditional jurisdiction to prescribe framework.
5.

Antitrust

Because the markets for many goods and services are
international, national antitrust rules must reach extraterritorially if
they are fully to achieve their purposes. This creates a problem if, as
is clearly the case, different countries have different purposes for their
antitrust laws. 9 There is thus the potential for a "true conflict."
Given the natural incentives for firms in the same market to agree to
limit competition where such agreements are not illegal, the absence
of a rule in one country against a particular kind of cartel, for
example, may reflect an intention to promote such agreements. At the
same time, another country's antitrust law's purposes might be such
that they can only be achieved fully if its anti-cartel regulations reach
the same set of competitors. In unusual cases, a party can even be
3
under conflicting commands from two countries' authorities. "
Avi-Yonah is correct in his suggestion that these conflicts are
difficult to resolve by traditional means.3" He takes this, however, as
a prime example of how there is too little MNE law and how there are
conflicts involving MINEs that would be better resolved through a
world investment organization patterned along the lines of the World
Trade Organization ("WTO").3 2 It may be that the conflicts created
by different countries' antitrust regimes would be best resolved by
29.

STE1NER ETAL., supra note 4, at 931-33.

30. See, e.g., the British Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, ch. 11, which
authorizes the U.K. Secretary of State to make orders forbidding private parties from
producing evidence sought under court order by foreign antitrust authorities. The Act is
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 834 (1982), and discussed in A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction:The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).

31.

See generally Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at 29.

32.

Id. at 31-35.
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some sort of entity established pursuant to a multinational treaty,
though I am not really sure of this conclusion. But any international
entity that is established should not be built around the phenomenon
of MNEs.
Clashes that occur between countries' differing antitrust goals
arise because of international trade, not the MNE phenomenon of
direct investment across state boundaries. It is international trade, not
investment, that enlarges beyond national boundaries the "relevant
market" for antitrust analysis, i.e., the market with respect to which is
measured the effect on competition of the behavior potentially subject
to regulation.33 A world with direct investment but no international
trade would have no such clashes. A world with international trade
but no direct investment would. It is therefore difficult to see why a
world investment organization is the right multilateral institution to
resolve such conflicts.
C.

Conclusion

This Part assumes that each country's government acts to
maximize the welfare of its residents. Using this assumption, it
examines a number of behaviors considered by Avi-Yonah that occur
within MNEs and that might require regulation. The objective, like
Avi-Yonah's, is to determine which government or institution should
have regulatory authority over each of these behaviors: the MNE's
home country government, its host country government, or some
multinational institution. The foregoing examination of Avi-Yonah's
examples does not support his contention that the rise of MNEs has
created sufficiently unique problems of regulation to require a
comprehensive reconceptualization of extraterritorial application of
national law nor does it support the creation of a WIO.
In two of Avi-Yonah's examples, bribery and child labor, the
involvement of an MNE does create a unique transnational effect. In
each case, though, the traditional jurisdiction to prescribe approach
seems serviceable and leads to the same conclusion as does AviYonah's approach-that both the host and home countries have
33. The only way in which the involvement of an MNE affects the problem is that it
will increase the effectiveness with which both the home country and host country can
enforce their prescriptions. The home country can use its jurisdiction over the parent to
control the behavior of the subsidiary in the host country. The host country has greater
leverage over the parent because of its jurisdiction over an asset of the parent: the host
country subsidiary. Thus it is possible that, by enhancing the effectiveness of each country's

regime, the presence of an MNE sharpens any conflict between them.
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regulatory authority. And, unlike Avi-Yonah's approach, it does so in
a way that does not depend on the possibly unrealistic assumption that
the host country agrees the behavior should be banned. In the other
three Avi-Yonah examples considered here-mass tort veil piercing,
bankruptcy and antitrust-the fact that an MNE is involved does not
seem to make regulatory problems different in important ways from if
one were not. Two of these three-mass tort veil piercing and
bankruptcy-also can be effectively analyzed pursuant to the
The traditional
traditional jurisdiction to prescribe approach.
approach has greater difficulty resolving the conflicts among states
regarding the third example-antitrust. These difficulties may justify
some kind of regime administered by a multinational institution. The
conflicts that need to be resolved, however, do not arise because of
MNE involvement. They are the inevitable result of international
trade extending the relevant antitrust markets for goods and services
beyond national boundaries. Thus, if a multinational institution is
needed, one relating solely to MNEs does not seem appropriate.
II.

CONSIDERING THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF
COUNTRIES

MNEs ON HOST

The discussion so far has proceeded on the assumption that
governments act in their countries' own best interests in deciding
whether to regulate certain behaviors and the content of any such
This assumption is obviously at best a first
regulations.
approximation of reality. Proponents of public choice theory, for
example, would find it quite unrealistic even as a description of our
own country, given their belief that public officials find it more
rewarding to respond to concentrated special interests than the
diffused, but in the aggregate more important, interests of most
residents. Advocates of campaign reform and other movements to
make our political system more responsive would also disagree with
the assumption. The assumption may be even more unrealistic in the
case of many developing countries that host MNE subsidiaries. As
noted in the introduction, the assumption is nevertheless conventional
in studying the regulation of behavior with cross-border effects,
perhaps because of the difficulty in finding or establishing
alternatives to national governments that could somehow better reflect
the interests of the residents of the countries involved.
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Reasonsfor Inquiry

The very growth of MNEs, the trigger for Avi-Yonah's call
for a new approach, adds, however, additional strain to the
assumption, at least in the case of host country regulation of MNEs.
Consider the sheer economic size of many MNEs and the role they
play individually and in the aggregate in the global economy and in
the economies of many host countries. These considerations suggest
that MNEs may often play a significant role in the politics of these
countries. In playing this role, they can be expected to pursue their
own interests, which may not always correspond with the best
interests of the residents of the country involved.
There is, of course, nothing new about this, as is illustrated by
the notorious involvement of United Fruit in the politics of its Latin
American host countries during the first half of the twentieth
century.34 It is also true that a certain level of MNE involvement in
the politics of host country governments may in fact be welfare
maximizing for the host country's residents. Without the prospect of
at least some such involvement, an MNE may be unwilling to invest
in a host country in the first place. This unwillingness would reflect
the MNE's fears concerning post investment exploitation by a
government responding to what are the short run interests of host
country residents. The MNE may feel that host country domestic
legal protections, international legal protections, host country
concerns about reputation and home country diplomacy would not,
without the supplement of MNE involvement in host country politics,
provide sufficient protection against such exploitation. Still, the
increased economic importance of MNEs makes it worthwhile to
consider at least briefly the implications of dropping the assumption,
via review of the five examples in Avi-Yonah's Article.
B.

The Examples Reconsidered

1.

Bhopal and Veil Piercing for Mass Torts

Part I concludes that where a host country has consistently
applied a veil piercing rule, the country is not prohibited under
34. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 354 (1909), for one
description of how United Fruit allegedly induced the Costa Rican government to seize a
competitor's banana plantation.
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international law from applying it to MNE parent corporations. Part I
also suggests that MNE home countries should assist in the
enforcement of such a rule, as in fact happened in the Bhopal case.
Suppose, however, that unlike the apparent situation with Bhopal, the
case involves a host country that does not have a consistently applied
veil piercing rule that would reach the MNE parent company. This
would raise the possibility that the absence of the rule is the product
of self-interested MNE influence on host country politics rather than a
calculation, given the trade-offs involved, that not piercing the veil
under the circumstances represents the best interests of the host
country's residents.
This case by its terms raises no issues with respect to the host
country: for good reasons or bad, it has decided not to extend to the
parent company liability for mass torts occurring within its territory
when the subsidiary has insufficient assets. But what about the home
country? If suit were brought against the parent in the courts of the
home country, the normal choice of law rule would be, at least in the
United States, to apply the veil piercing rule of the jurisdiction of the
subsidiary, which in this case would be the host country rule not to
pierce the veil.35 The possibility that the host country rule was the
product of self-interested MNE involvement in host country politics
raises the issue of whether the home country court should instead
apply the home country veil piercing rule if that rule is more liberal.
My preliminary answer is that the court should do so in flagrant cases
of self-interested MNE involvement but not otherwise. If the home
country court applies its own country's veil piercing rule, it is in
essence substituting its own judgment concerning what rule ex ante is
in the best interests of the residents of the host country for that of the
host country's own political institutions. The home country court
should not do so unless it is confident that it is correct despite the fact
that, relative to the host country's political organs, the home country
court has only limited knowledge of the underlying economic and
social conditions in the host country and the preferences of host
35. Under U.S. choice of law rules, the extent to which incorporation protects
shareholders from liability is determined by the corporate law of the jurisdiction of
incorporation.

EUGENE SCHOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 23.2, 23.5 (2d ed.

1992). See also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 302(2) (1971) (providing that
"the local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine such issues, except in
the unusual case where, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the
other state will be applied"). In DassaultFalcon Jet Corp. v. Oberflex, Inc., 909 F.Supp. 345
(M.D.N.C. 1995), a federal district court followed this section of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws and held that in determining whether the corporate veil of a North Carolina
subsidiary of a French parent company would be pierced, the law of the subsidiary's state of
incorporation would govern.
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country citizens.
2.

Bribery

Bribery is widespread in many developing countries. As
discussed in Part I, this may indicate that the effects of this bribery are
not considered undesirable in these countries. Alternatively, as will
be discussed here, it may suggest some kind of deep-seated political
failure in these countries. Specifically, MNEs, if not constrained by
law, may find it to be in their respective individual best interests to
pay large sums of money to gain access to a host country's potential
investment opportunities. These payments result in a pattern of
decisions that is not welfare maximizing for the country as a whole,
but the rewards they bring their recipients overwhelm whatever
incentives participants in the host country's political process have to
improve social welfare by effectively stopping the payments.
This possibility does not change the analysis with regard to the
host country: again, for good reasons or bad, its government officials
have decided not to put an effective end to the practice. If the reason
the practice has taken hold is host country political failure, however,
effective prohibition of the practice by MINE home country
governments may not reduce MNEs' costs of doing business. This
has implications with regard to home country reasons for effectively
stopping the practice extraterritorially through their jurisdiction over
the MNE parent companies. As analyzed in Part I, bribe taking
officials are using their control of access to the host country's
investment opportunities to acquire for themselves a portion of the
rents associated with implementing positive NPV projects-rents that
are the joint product of MNE skills at finding investment
opportunities and the unique opportunities available to be found in the
host country. If an effective home country prohibition ends the
bribes, the host country government may step in and charge
concession fees or taxes as some kind as a substitute condition for
access to the investment opportunities. Or, private property owners
may receive more for granting access to the opportunity. Ending the
practice, rather than allowing the MNEs to capture all instead of only
part of the rents, will instead simply steer the portion that had been
received by corrupt officials instead into the national treasury or to
private property holders.
Despite the fact that under this scenario, the MNEs enjoy no
direct economic gain from ending the practice, the MNE home
countries may still have reasons beyond avoiding political
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embarrassment for stopping the practice. The MNE home countries
may feel, for example, that the virtues of the rule of law-the
improved host country decision making that comes from eliminating
the bribes-will benefit the home country because of the resulting
improvements in host country economic growth and political stability.
The bottom line conclusion in Part I relating to bribes is
unchanged: An MNE home country ban on payments in host
countries, although it is extraterritorial legislation, is within the home
country's jurisdiction to prescribe. This is true whether the home
country's reason is, as analyzed in Part I, the internationally legal
effort to increase their MINEs' portions of the rents available from
implementing positive net present value projects in host countries, or
whether the home country's reason is the benefits it sees for itself
from the end of a corrupt practice that is not welfare maximizing in
the host country. Indeed, the home country does not even need to be
sure which of these two results it is accomplishing, since it benefits
either way and both are within its jurisdiction to prescribe.
3.

Child labor

Dropping the assumption that states act to maximize their
citizens' welfare has an impact on the analysis of child labor similar
to its impact on the analysis of bribery. Like bribery, child labor is
widespread in many developing countries. As discussed in Part I, this
may indicate that given the trade-offs these countries face at this point
in their development, these countries in fact do not view child labor as
undesirable. Again, however, it may indicate instead some kind of
deep-seated political failure in these countries.
The possibility of host country political failure does not
change the analysis with respect to the host country regulation. For
good reasons or bad, host country government officials have decided
not to put an effective end to child labor. As for home country
prohibitions against its MNEs employing children in host countries,
Part I concluded that such extraterritorial regulation, when motivated
by moral sensibilities, was within its jurisdiction to prescribe. This
conclusion held even if the host country government faithfully tried to
represent the best interests of its residents and implicitly favored child
employment. This conclusion is simply reinforced if, because of the
political power of MNEs, we drop the assumption that the goal of
host government is necessarily to maximize the welfare of its
residents.
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Bankruptcy and Antitrust

The analysis in Part I of the bankruptcy and antitrust examples
suggests that the power of MNEs to influence host country politics is
not in any way related to the issues that these examples raise. In
bankruptcy, any ex post effort of the home country to extend its rules
extraterritorially to the host country appears doomed. In terms of any
ex ante efforts to deal with the problem, the interests of the MNEs
would appear to be aligned with the interests of both countries.36 The
problem in antitrust comes from a clash in aims of different countries'
antitrust policies that come into play because of international trade.
Moreover, these differences in policies do not appear to be due to the
influence of multinationals on host country politics.

C.

Conclusions

These examples do not suggest that dropping the assumption
that the goal of a host country government is to maximize welfare of
its residents leads to a substantial change in conclusions. This result
may arise from the nature of the particular issues under study,
however. Each of the three examples where dropping the assumption
could be relevant-veil piercing, bribery and child labor-had the
following characteristics: The host government chooses not to
regulate, perhaps because of the self-interested influence of MNEs on
its politics and the home seeks to regulate the behavior
extraterritorially. With these examples, the question in Part II is the
effect on the home country's jurisdiction to prescribe if the host
country's failure to regulate is due to self-interested MNE influence.
In the bribery and child labor examples, the possibility of MNE
influence simply reinforces the conclusion that there is jurisdiction to
prescribe. In the veil piercing example, the conclusion is that home
country concerns about host country resident welfare might justify
applying its own more liberal veil piercing rules, but that the home
country should proceed with considerable caution.
These examples miss an interesting set of cases. Consider the
situation where MNE influence on the host country blocks the country
from regulating in a way that would maximize the welfare of host
country residents. The home countries, not wishing to harm interests
of their MNEs, do nothing.
This sort of problem is what has given rise to efforts to have
36.

Avi-Yonah shares this view. See generally Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at 31.
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multinational bodies promulgate corporate codes of conduct such as
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's
("UNCTAD's") Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations. I
would agree with Avi-Yonah that UNCTAD failed because it focused
too much on the negative effects of certain MNE behaviors on
developing countries without considering the costs of prohibiting
these behaviors in terms of reduced investment.3" Developing a code
of conduct that would actually improve the welfare of developing
countries and gamer support in the developed world as well would
require sorting out when host country failure to act is because of an
honest determination that the cost of reduced investment is greater
than the gain of eliminating the behavior and when the failure to act is
the result of political failure in the host countries due to INE
influence. If scholarly progress were made on this extraordinarily
challenging agenda, then the basis might be laid for a truly useful
WIO.

37.

Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at 33.
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